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The Minnesota Journal of International Law celebrated its
twenty-fifth anniversary on March 30, 2016. Drawing from its
roots in international trade and economics, the Symposium,
entitled "25 Years, Where Are We Now? Global Trade & Sovereign
Debt" critically analyzed some of today's important challenges at
the intersection of law and economics.
Thank you very much, Dean Wippman. When you
mentioned what it's like to be a dean, it reminded me of a
comment by Lance Liebman when he became a dean. At an
alumni gathering to meet him, someone said, "Congratulations,
you are such an incredible scholar." Lance replied, "Before I
became a dean, people thought I was a credible scholar."
I am going to talk about sovereign debt and sovereign debt
restructuring. Unresolved sovereign debt problems are hurting
debtor-nations, hurting their citizens, and, in some ways,
hurting their creditors. Also, a sovereign debt default can pose a
serious systemic threat to the international financial system.
Unlike people and unlike corporations, countries cannot use
bankruptcy or insolvency laws to restructure unsustainable
debt-that is, debt that's beyond their ability to pay. Many
blame nations for incurring that much debt. But in many cases,
the lenders are equally to blame because they extend credit on
very easy terms, expecting to be bailed out if there is a problem.
There has been a debate over the past few decades over how
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to address the problem of unsustainable sovereign debt. The
approach that, until recently, has been, and probably remains,
most common, is the so-called contractual approach. I will
contrast that with what I call the statutory approach.
In the contractual approach, the parties to the sovereign
debt contracts themselves renegotiate these contracts or enter
into exchange offers with the debtor-state, whereby they try to
find a way to facilitate a restructuring. One of the main problems
is that many sovereign debt contracts require unanimity to
change essential payment terms: the principal amount, the rate
of interest, the maturities, and so forth. It is almost impossible
to achieve unanimity. To try to solve that problem, the
contractual approach focuses on inserting into sovereign debt
contracts (either when they are executed or by amendment at a
later date) what are called collective-action clauses-which are
often referred to as CACs. CACs allow a form of super-majority
voting, enabling creditors to change the terms of that contract
without requiring unanimity.
One problem with CACs is that relatively few sovereign debt
contracts include them. As illustrated by the Greek debt crisis,
most of that country's debt contracts lacked CACs. Another
problem with CACs is that, until recently, most CACs only
pertained to the contract in which they were included. For
example, take a very simple case of a debtor-state with three
bond issues. Even if each of these bond issues had a contractual
CAC, so the terms of each could be changed by super-majority
voting, that voting could only bind the parties to that individual
bond issue. What this means is that any of these bond issues
could act as a holdout and defeat a settlement among all the
bond issues.
The collective action "aggregation" clauses that the
International Capital Markets Association has recently been
advocating would extend the super-majority voting beyond a
particular bond issue. But almost no sovereign debt contracts
currently have these CAC aggregation clauses, and-even if
CAC aggregation clauses were included in every new sovereign
debt contract-it would be decades before most contracts would
have them.
Next, contrast the contractual approach with a more
statutory approach. Until recently, a statutory approach has
focused on an international convention or treaty (those terms are
synonymous). The goal would be to have an international treaty
governing sovereign debt restructuring.
SCHWARCZ
Let me give you some perspective on how the statutory
approach has evolved. The first official proposal for some sort of
international treaty framework for sovereign debt restructuring
appears in the United States' 1942 initial draft of the charter of
the International Monetary Fund, the IMF. Nothing happened
at that time, and nothing happened until the mid-1980s when
economist Jeffrey Sachs called, in an unpublished paper, for
some sort of international sovereign debt restructuring
standard. He observed that the IMF, as an international lender
of last resort in almost all sovereign debt restructurings, would
de facto lead the restructuring effort. But he concluded that "the
structure of IMF-led debt restructurings has been woefully
inadequate, especially when compared to corporate bankruptcy
debt restructurings."
Jeffrey's work inspired a number of scholars, including
myself, to write on the topic. In 2000, for example, and with the
help of University of Minnesota Law School Professor Fred
Morrison, I published an article in the Cornell Law Review going
methodically through how one could adapt various concepts from
corporate bankruptcy law into sovereign debt restructuring.1 A
year after, based on my work and that of other scholars from
around the world, the IMF proposed its sovereign debt
restructuring mechanism, the so-called SDRM. This was a
treaty approach adapting a range of concepts from bankruptcy
law to restructuring sovereign debt.
Initially, the U.S. Department of the Treasury supported
the SDRM. But the Secretary of the Treasury was then fired for
other political reasons, and the new Secretary opposed the
SDRM. Furthermore, various emerging market countries,
including Turkey, Mexico, and Brazil, opposed the SDRM,
concerned that it would raise the interest rates on their
sovereign bonds.
The most recent official support of the statutory approach
was the 2014 United Nations General Assembly vote, led by the
Group of 77 developing nations, to begin working on a treaty
(calling it a multilateral framework) to restructure sovereign
debt. Although this U.N. effort has come up with some very
general principles, in reality it appears to be going nowhere
because the United States and the European Union are opposing
it. The reasons for their opposition are not completely clear.
1. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy
Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956 (2000).
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There may be concerns that such an international treaty could
take some sovereign prerogatives away from the United States
and the European Union. Whatever the reasons, efforts to solve
the problem of unsustainable sovereign debt are effectively at a
standstill.
I would like to raise today at least a partial solution, what I
call a model-law approach to sovereign debt restructuring. Many
of you should be familiar with a model law. It is essentially a
statute that is proposed and is intended to be enacted in the
same form by multiple individual jurisdictions. The most
common example of a model law in the United States is probably
the Uniform Commercial Code, or UCC. An international
example of a model law would be the UNCITRAL (United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law) Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration.
When multiple nations enact the same form of a model law,
it resembles a treaty. But there are important differences
between a model law and a treaty. A treaty is more binding in
the sense that, once a nation agrees to it, it is harder to get out
of it or modify. Once a nation (or other jurisdiction) enacts a
model law, it can choose to modify or revoke it at any time,
simply by passing internal legislation. A model law is thus more
flexible and informal than a treaty, and it also could be pursued
in parallel to a treaty approach (such as the effort by the United
Nations to develop a treaty for restructuring sovereign debt). For
these reasons, a model-law approach is valuable for
experimenting with ideas as to which there are not standard
norms, like sovereign debt restructuring. To this end, I recently
drafted a model law-which I'll hereafter call the "Model Law"-
that proposes norms and detailed rules for restructuring
sovereign debt.2
More critically, a model-law approach could be a very
powerful debt-restructuring tool in today's sovereign debt
environment because 95% of all sovereign debt contracts are
governed by either New York law (the slight majority) or English
law. Thus, if New York State-a sub-national entity that enacts
its law through a state legislature in Albany-were to enact a
2. See Steven A. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Model-Law
Approach, 6 J. GLOBALIZATION & DEV. 343, 377 81 (2016) (proposing a model
law for sovereign debt restructuring). See also CENTRE FOR INT'L GOVERNANCE
INNOVATION, A MODEL-LAW APPROACH TO RESTRUCTURING UNSUSTAINABLE
SOVEREIGN DEBT (2015), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/pb no.
64.pdf.
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state law in the form of the Model Law, that would enable all of
the sovereign debt contracts governed by New York law to go
from a unanimity voting requirement to super-majority voting.
Additionally, the Model Law would facilitate private-sector
interim funding, which has in the past been provided by the
IMF. The IMF itself has recognized that it does not have enough
funding to continue this for all nations that need interim
funding.
If in addition to New York State enacting the Model Law,
England (which legislates through Parliament) also enacts the
Model Law, 95% of all sovereign debt contracts would be
governed by the Model Law. You'd only need these one or two
jurisdictions to make a massive impact.
And I should emphasize that the Model Law is intended to
be retroactive. Its enactment by New York State and/or the
United Kingdom could therefore immediately solve a lot of the
major problems we currently have with sovereign debt. I will
talk a bit about the legality of retroactivity, but under
international law, retroactivity is permitted as long as it does
not discriminate and is not arbitrary, neither of which occurs
here. Under English law, retroactivity is permitted. New York
state law permits retroactivity, but the potential problem, as I
will shortly discuss, is the Contracts Clause under the
Constitution.
Let's first talk about some of the key provisions of the Model
Law. The Model Law's goal is to restore debtor-states to debt
sustainability. That would relieve undue economic burden on the
debtor-states' citizens; enable the debtor-state to pay its debts,
thereby avoiding a default that could have systemic
consequences; reduce creditor uncertainty; and reduce the need
for costly debt bailouts, which create, or at least foster, moral
hazard. The claims covered by the Model Law include not only
long-term debt claims, like sovereign bonds, but also short-term
debt claims, the equivalent in the sovereign debt world of
corporate commercial paper. Lee Buchheit, the head of Cleary
Gottlieb's sovereign debt restructuring department, identifies
rollover risk of short-term sovereign debt-the risk that a
country borrowing on a short-term basis cannot refund the
maturing debt by issuing new debt-as the major future
sovereign debt risk. This is the same problem that the United
States government found itself in, a few years ago, when the U.S.
Congress was quagmired as to whether it would raise the debt
ceiling. If Congress did not raise the debt ceiling, the United
States would have been unable to issue more indebtedness to
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refund its maturing debt and could have defaulted. 3
The Model Law contemplates a supervisory authority to
administer the sovereign debt restructuring process. This
sometimes raises a political concern because many, including
U.S. officials, have conflated the concept of a supervisory
authority with the restructuring process itself. They fear that
the supervisory authority could impede on national sovereignty.
At least under the Model Law, any supervisory authority would
have only ministerial power, such as counting votes.
The central part of the Model Law is its solution to the so-
called holdout problem, a collective action problem. This is the
main problem of sovereign debt restructuring which I mentioned
at the outset, the need for unanimity to change the maturity, or
the interest rate, or the principal, or some of the other key terms
of sovereign debt contracts. This problem is nicely illustrated in
a movie I show each year to my bankruptcy class, "Waking Ned
Divine."
The movie is set in some small town in, I think, Ireland. Ned
Divine wins the national lottery and promptly drops dead of
shock. He has no heirs. His winnings are going to go back to the
state unless the town's people have someone pretend to be Ned
Divine. Ned's best friend proposes to do this, but he needs all the
town's people to back him up. In return, he agrees to share the
winnings equally and ratably among the people. But one person
refuses to cooperate unless she gets a bigger share. That's the
holdout problem. You may not want to solve it as done in the
movie-the holdout is in a phone booth calling the authorities,
when a car with the lottery people careens out of control and hits
the phone booth, which goes flying into the ocean. Far better to
try to solve the holdout problem with super-majority voting. The
Model Law provides that super-majority voting.
The Model Law also provides incentives for private-sector
interim funding. Although the IMF has provided that in the
past, I mentioned that it does not have enough money to
continue funding all the nations that need it during the
restructuring process. Furthermore, many countries may not
want IMF interim funding. The IMF imposes what is called
"conditionality" on borrowing nations, requiring those nations to
adopt strict austerity measures. In Greece, for example, there
was a lot of controversy about the harm that may have been
3. See, e.g., Steven A. Schwarcz, Rollover Risk: Ideating a U.S. Debt
Default, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2014).
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caused.
So how does the Model Law incentivize private-sector
interim funding? Nobody is going to lend to a debtor in trouble
unless their repayment claims have priority. In corporate
bankruptcy, section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code subordinates
those repayment claims as a matter of law to the interim
funding. In theory, the contractual approach could accomplish
that if all holders of those claims agree to contractually
subordinate their claims. In practice, however, that is very
unlikely to happen. The Model Law would accomplish that like
section 364, legislatively subordinating repayment claims to the
interim funding. The Model Law also protects holders of those
claims by requiring their consent, by super-majority voting, to
such subordination.
That's the outline of the Model Law. Let's now turn to its
legal feasibility, which has only one real issue: whether its
retroactivity would be restricted by the Contracts Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, art. 1, § 10. Although the federal government
can retroactively impair contracts, the Contracts Clause
prohibits states themselves from doing so. The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, has created various exceptions to the Contracts
Clause, of which two should apply to the Model Law's
retroactivity.
One exception is under a state's police powers. A contractual
impairment is permitted to the extent it's a reasonable exercise
of a state's police powers. If New York State enacted the Model
Law to try to mitigate or solve half of the world's sovereign debt
problem that would protect its economy because it would greatly
reduce the chance of a sovereign debt default, which could
trigger a broader systemic economic collapse.
The other exception is based on reasonableness. In order for
a contractual impairment to violate the Contracts Clause, it
must be a significant impairment. Because the Model Law
requires any retroactive modification to be agreed to by a super-
majority of similarly situated creditors, any such modification
would reflect what those creditors believe, based on the then
reasonable expectations, they could realistically expect to
receive as payment.
Let's next turn to the Model Law's economic feasibility and
its costs and benefits to nations and their creditors. Certainly, a
nation whose debt has been restructured is going to benefit. One
question is whether the Model Law, by its existence, would
increase a country's ex ante borrowing costs-a country, for
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example, that is not in default. Recall that certain emerging
market countries opposed the IMF's SDRM because they feared
it would make their sovereign debt more expensive. Many
economists have recently studied this, and they conclude to the
contrary: that the absence of an effective sovereign debt-
restructuring framework increases the cost of borrowing, and
that any costs would probably go down if there were such a
framework.
In addition, the super-majority, aggregate voting
contemplated by the Model Law would be no different than if all
sovereign debt contracts had super-majority aggregation CACs.
Everyone, even those who advocate the contractual approach,
believes that's an ideal goal. Finally, there is empirical work,
including by my colleague Mitu Gulati who does a lot of excellent
sovereign debt work, suggesting that the inclusion of CACs does
not increase sovereign interest rates and may even decrease
them.
From a political feasibility standpoint, I have mentioned
that the Model Law should be more feasible than a treaty. You
do not need all nations to agree, all you realistically need is New
York State and/or England. Furthermore, one could assess the
Model Law's political feasibility by comparing it to the failure of
the IMF's SDRM. There are two principal reasons the SDRM
failed. One reason, besides the unjustified fear of the increase in
rates, is that at the time it was proposed, in 2001, many believed
that coerced exchange offers, combined with the ability to amend
sovereign bond contracts, provided an adequate mechanism for
sovereign debt restructuring. Experience has taught us
otherwise. In fact, in many jurisdictions, coerced exchange offers
are probably not legal. Secondly, some countries opposed the
SDRM because they were suspicious about the IMF's role. The
IMF, under the SDRM, was the supervisory body for a process
designed by the IMF. This sparked concern about conflicts of
interest and excessive IMF conditionality. Of course, none of
that is relevant here.
In closing, I am not saying that a model-law approach is
absolutely feasible. I hope it is feasible, and in fact the Centre
for International Governance Innovation, with which I'm a
Senior Fellow (in addition to my role at Duke), is beginning to
engage in a major effort to try to facilitate the Model Law.
Cornell University and its Law School are also very interested
in working with us on this. We hope to have a major conference
soon that may even include leading New York State officials and
legislators. But even if nothing goes forward on a model-law
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front, the very discussion of that approach and its ability to
facilitate sovereign debt restructuring can hopefully help to
develop norms about how sovereign debt should be restructured
to sustainable levels.
QUESTION 1
You mentioned Professor Stieglitz. He is not deeply loved on
Wall Street, so I wonder if this type of arrangement has been
introduced to Goldman Sachs or JP Morgan? What do they say?
Do they say that it is great for the creditors?
STEVEN SCHWARCZ
We are doing this on a very preliminary basis. A week and
a half ago, the head of CIGI's international law research
program and I were in Washington, D.C. and had meetings with
the IMF and leading organizations that advocate fair approaches
to sovereign debt restructuring, including Jubilee Network USA.
We next intend to meet with major Wall Street investors in
sovereign debt.
QUESTION 2
Very interesting, Steven. I wonder in the restructuring
process whether the most important issue wouldn't be
determining how much to reduce the debt owed, and exactly how
that would be done under this model law. Part of that, I assume,
would be determining what kinds of policy reforms would be
necessary to cover the restructured debt. I wonder who is going to
make those decisions about the impairment and the policy
reforms.
STEVEN SCHWARCZ
The Model Law contemplates that a debtor nation itself
would begin the process by certifying that it needs a
restructuring to achieve debt sustainability. The restructuring
plan, which would have to be approved by the nation's creditors
(under super-majority voting) before it became effective, would
set out the means by which the nation expects to make its debt
sustainable again. By analogy to corporate bankruptcy law, this
would parallel section 1129(a) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
including the condition that the restructuring plan is feasible
and should restore the debtor's financial viability. So a debtor
nation under the Model Law has the burden to put forth a plan
that persuades its creditors that it is going to be successful. If it
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can't, its creditors are going to vote no. This is a give-and-take
consensus process, as opposed to being micromanaged from on
top.
QUESTION 3
Does the statutory approach you are proposing also apply for
U.S. states, for example, Puerto Rico right now?
STEVEN SCHWARCZ
The statutory approach I am proposing, the Model Law, is
intended to, at least as drafted, to deal with sovereign nation
debt. Its restructuring norms, however, would be applicable to
Puerto Rico. But the most direct way to address Puerto Rico's
debt problems would probably be for Congress to include it
within Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. I do not think that
introducing the Model Law idea into U.S. domestic politics
would go very far, but I do not know.
QUESTION 4
What do the rating agencies think about the model law?
STEVEN SCHWARCZ
I have only discussed this so far with a senior executive at
Moody's, who thinks it's an interesting idea but has not studied
it in any systematic way. I do not see why the rating agencies
should be troubled. Companies are subject to the same types of
statutory debt restructuring provisions, yet their debt is
routinely rated.
